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STATISTICAL INEQUALITY AND INTENTIONAL (NOT IMPLICIT)
DISCRIMINATION
Michael Selmi1
I
INTRODUCTION
This equality business has proven difficult. Since the passage of the Civil Rights Acts in
the 1960s, our nation has made undeniable progress toward racial equality, but it is equally
undeniable that this progress has been more limited than what civil rights advocates had
envisioned. Schools remain deeply segregated by race, with large achievement gaps persisting.2
Segregation also remains the predominant motif in housing—so much so that the push for
integrated housing has largely been all but lost.3 In the workplace, African-American males
continue to have an unemployment rate twice that of white males, and this has been true for
decades and at every educational level.4 Relatedly, there is a substantial wage gap again
regardless of the educational level of the workers.5 It has also been well documented that African
Americans are overrepresented in prison6 and in school discipline,7 and have significantly less
wealth accumulation than whites.8
1

Samuel Tyler Research Professor, George Washington University Law School. An earlier version of this paper was
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For a recent analysis of school segregation, see Richard Rothstein, For Public Schools, Segregation Then,
Segregation Since: Education and the Unfinished March, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Aug. 27, 2013),
www.epi.org/files/2014/Unfinished-March-School-Segregation.pdf.
3
Although progress has been made on residential segregation in many jurisdictions, the progress has generally been
relatively limited by most conventional measures. See, e.g., PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN
NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE END OF PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY 9 (2013) (“Despite the high hopes of the
civil rights era, the finding that emerges very clearly is that the stark racial inequality in America’s neighborhoods
that existed in the 1970s has been pass on, with little change, to the current generation.”); John R. Logan, Separate
& Unequal: The Neighborhood Gap for Blacks, Hispanics & Asians in Metropolitan America, US2010 PROJECT
(July 2011), www.s4.brown.edu/us2010/Data/Report/report0727.pdf (noting that, on average, black and Hispanic
households live in neighborhoods with one-and-a-half the poverty rate of predominately white neighborhoods).
4
See Drew Desilver, Black Unemployment Rate is Consistently Twice that of Whites, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 21,
2013), http://pewrsr.ch/13FFoUo (documenting historical unemployment gap dating to 1954). Unemployment
rates vary by educational levels with individuals at the lowest educational levels having the highest unemployment.
But no matter the level, African Americans are unemployed at twice the rate whites. In 2011, blacks with less than a
high school degree had 31.7% unemployment rate and whites had 18.1%. For those with advanced degrees, the rates
were 5.8% for blacks and 3.0% for whites. See LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 341
(12th ed. 2012).
5
Even those African Americans with advanced degrees make less than whites who have obtained the same level of
education. See Median Weekly Earnings By Education Attainment in 2014, BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Jan. 23, 2015),
http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2015/median-weekly-earnings-by-education-gender-race-and-ethnicity-in-2014.htm.
6
Based on the latest statistics on inmates in state and federal—but not local—prisons, African Americans are
imprisoned at a rate that is six times higher than that for whites, with black males incarcerated at a rate that is nine
times higher than the rate for white males. See Ann E. Carson, Prisoners in 2013, U.S. DEP’T JUST., BUREAU JUST.
STAT. 3 (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf. Thirty-six percent of the 1.5 million
prisoners were African Americans. Although this has been a long-standing issue, Professor Michelle Alexander has
brought heightened attention to the issue. . See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
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These statistics are likely to produce one of three responses, what I will refer to as (1)
“Yes but . . . ,” (2) “Racism is everywhere,” and (3) “Tell me more.” Those in the “yes but”
category are discrimination skeptics who resist concluding that discrimination underlies the
observed inequities and they seek alternative explanations. Those in the second group see
discrimination everywhere there are disparities and may go so far as to cast racial aspersions on
those in the first group. The third group wants to know more about the inequities, wants to know
more about why wage gaps persist even at the highest levels, or why affluent African Americans
tend to live in neighborhoods that are less affluent than their white cohorts.9 To be sure, some of
those who initially may want more information, those who start of by saying “tell me more” will
turn out to be skeptics as there will be no additional information that will convince them that the
inequities are the product of discrimination.
This essay examines how we can reach agreement and come to a mutual understanding
about when discrimination is responsible for the many inequalities that persist in society. This is
a critical question because in the United States, as a matter of policy, we are committed to
remedying discrimination, not inequality. In other words, we will only address racial inequality
that is the product of discrimination.10 As a result, it is important to have a broad and consensual
definition of discrimination.
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS, 2 (2012) (asserting that our criminal justice system has
disenfranchised a disproportionate percentage of the black population).
7
Inequities in school discipline will be discussed in the next section, but a recent government study found that,
whereas African Americans comprise 16% of the public-school population, they account for 33% of out-of-school
suspensions and 34% of expulsions. See Data Snapshot: School Discipline, U. S. DEP’T EDUC. OFF. CIV. RTS. 2
(Mar. 2014), www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/crdc-discipline-snapshot.pdf.
Based on 2013 data, whites have average net worth that is thirteen times larger than African Americans, which is
the highest measured disparity since 1989. See Rakesh Kochar & Richard Fry, Wealth Inequality Has Widened
Along Racial Ethnic Lines Since End of Great Recession (2014), available at www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2014/12/12/racial-wealth-gaps-great-recession.9 This has long been true and was reaffirmed by 2010 Census
data. See JOHN R. LOGAN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: THE NEIGHBORHOOD GAP FOR BLACKS, HISPANICS & ASIANS
IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 1 (2011), www.s4.brown.edu/us2010/Data/Report/report0727.pdf (“With one
exception (the most Affluent Asians) minorities at every income level live in poorer neighborhoods than do whites
with comparable incomes.”).
9
This has long been true and was reaffirmed by 2010 Census data. See JOHN R. LOGAN, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL:
THE NEIGHBORHOOD GAP FOR BLACKS, HISPANICS & ASIANS IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 1 (2011),
www.s4.brown.edu/us2010/Data/Report/report0727.pdf (“With one exception (the most Affluent Asians) minorities
at every income level live in poorer neighborhoods than do whites with comparable incomes.”).
10
Affirmative action might appear to provide a contrary example, but that is not necessarily so. From its inception,
affirmative action has been a deeply contested policy and it has always been used as a modest tool of remediation.
Affirmative action has taken hold only in higher education, an important but limited institution, at least in terms of
addressing inequality. The courts, in fact, have squelched affirmative action in the housing context. See, e.g., See
United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1103 (2d Cir. 1988) (invalidating quota program for public
housing that was designed to integrate the housing). As to school desegregation, busing and racial redistricting
might be seen as adjuncts of affirmative action, but both of those initiatives were designed to remedy discrimination,
rather than the underlying inequalities, and both receded once it appeared that discrimination had run its course. In
the context of busing, three short years after approving as busing as a remedy to desegregate schools, the Supreme
Court prohibited busing that sought to cross school district boundaries, severely limiting busing’s remedial force.
Compare Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (approving busing as a remedial option
to desegregate schools) with Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (invalidating busing plan that sought to
include the Detroit suburbs). In the voting rights context, the Supreme Court was hostile to racial redistricting from
the outset. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (applying strict scrutiny to and rejecting North Carolina’s
redistricting plan).
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This essay is concerned with racial equality and will focus on two areas in which the data
are strikingly clear but the causal links between inequality and discrimination are often
contested. The first area is school discipline, especially suspension and expulsion, which has had
a longstanding, well-documented, and disproportionate effect on African Americans, particularly
African American boys.11 The data are clear that African Americans are far more likely to be
suspended or expelled than white students, with similar results for expulsions.12 The second area
I will analyze is racial profiling— with a particular focus on automobile stops, or what is
colloquially known as “driving while black.” Much as is true with school discipline, the data on
automobile stops are indisputable; African Americans—and to a lesser extent Latinos—are far
more likely to be stopped than are whites, even though white drivers are more likely to be found
in possession of contraband.13 Yet in both of these areas, there is strong resistance by responsible
policymakers to attributing these inequities to discrimination, particularly in the context of police
stops where every possible alternative explanation is often explored and asserted.14 I have
decided to focus on these two areas because the relevant data are compelling, and yet the
public’s desire to avoid a finding of discrimination often appears to be equally strong.
The third part of this essay discusses the high standards imputed to statistical inequities as
proof of discrimination and the many ways in which discrimination skeptics and others seek to
avoid concluding that statistical disparities are a product of discrimination. This essay also
suggests, contrary to current trends in scholarship, that the move to define the disparities as
“implicit bias” has hurt more than it has helped and the observed disparities should not be
confused with implicit bias as repeated patterns of behavior will almost certainly have a
conscious component to them 15 Finally, the last part of the essay will suggest the importance of
ensuring accountability as the best way of reducing statistical disparities, regardless of whether
we can obtain consensus on the underlying rationale for the disparities.
II
RACIAL INEQUITIES IN SCHOOL DISCIPLINE AND POLICE STOPS
Racial inequities remain a persistent fact of social and economic life in the United States.
Some of those inequities – many people place housing in this category – might be the product of
class or even personal choices, and to the extent the observed inequities are the product of
personal choices, it is often thought that there is little reason to intervene to address them.16 As
11

See sec. II. A., infra.
Id.
13
The issue is discussed in section II.B., infra.
14
For a thorough critique of studies that document disparities in police stops see Greg Ridgeway & John McDonald,
Methods for Assessing Racially Biased Policing, in RACE, ETHNICITY AND POLICING: NEW & ESSENTIAL READINGS,
at 180-204 (S. Price & M. White 2010). These critiques, which often focus on possible differences in driving
behavior between studied groups, will be discussed further in section II, B., infra.
15
See section III, infra.
16
This sentiment is most pronounced in the school desegregation cases, including in the most recent Supreme Court
case where the Court viewed the segregation of the schools as a product of housing choices. See Parents Involved in
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 713 (2007) (emphasizing that the segregated nature of the
Seattle schools was a function of where students lived). This view that private housing choices are beyond
constitutional reach has a long pedigree in the school cases. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974)
(prohibiting multi-district remedy designed to address discrimination within Detroit School District). For an
analysis of the connection between the school cases and housing choices see Erika Frankenberg & Genevieve
12
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has been well documented, ambiguity is often the death knell for efforts to address observed
inequities.17 This part therefore avoids ambiguity by focusing on two areas in which the data are
incontrovertible: school discipline and police stops. In these two areas, it is impossible to deny
the existence of significant racial inequities, but attributing those inequities to discrimination
turns out to be another matter entirely.
A. School Discipline
There is a tragic quality to the data on school discipline, and that is that African
Americans have been subject to far more frequent and harsher discipline than have white
students. It is difficult to know just how long this has been going on but the phenomenon has
been documented going back to the 1970s when a Children’s Defense Fund report demonstrated
that black students were two to three times more likely to be suspended compared to white
students in various localities throughout the nation.18 Since that time, matters have actually
worsened because suspensions and expulsions have sharply increased, and the harms of school
exclusions have become clearer.19
The racial inequities in the administration of school discipline are so well established that
a court could likely take judicial notice of them. In fact, it is difficult to find a jurisdiction in
which African American students are not subject to greater discipline than white students. Recent
data collected by the United States Department of Education indicate that black students are
suspended and expelled at a rate that was three times higher than the rate for white students, and
that, although blacks constitute 16% of the student population, they account for 32% of out-ofschool suspensions and 31% of student arrests.20 What is perhaps most alarming, is that the
disparities begin as early as preschool, where African Americans account for 48% of out-ofschool suspensions despite being only 18% of the student population.21

Siegel-Hawley, Public Decisions and Private Choices: Reassessing the School-Housing Segregation Link in the
Post Parents Involved Era, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 397 (2013).
17
For a discussion of how discrimination often operates in ambiguous situations—where there is no clear decision,
for example—see Adam R. Pearson, John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, The Nature of Contemporary
Prejudice: Insights from Aversive Racism, 3 SOC. & PERSONALITY COMPASS 1, 5 (2009) (discussing ways aversive
racism operates in ambiguous social norms).
18
See CHILDREN’S DEFENSE FUND, SCHOOL SUSPENSIONS: ARE THEY HELPING CHILDREN? 9 (1975) (“While the
largest numbers of suspended children are white, proporationally suspensions hurt more children who are black,
poor, older and male.”).
19
See, e.g., James Wallace et al., Racial, Ethnic and Gender Differences in School Discipline Among U.S. High
School Students: 1991-2005, 59 NEGRO EDUC. REV. 47, 48. (2008) (documenting increase in suspensions). It has
been well-documented that suspensions are connected with future involvement with the criminal justice system. See
Anne Gregory, Russell J. Skiba & Pedro A. Noguera, The Achievement Gap and the Discipline Gap: Two Sides of
the Same Coin?, 39 EDUC. RESEARCHER 59, 60 (2010) (“Research shows that frequent suspensions appear to
significantly increase the risk of academic nonperformance.”).
20
See Data Snapshot: School Discipline, U. S. DEP’T EDUC. OFF. CIV. RTS. 2 (Mar. 2014),
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/crdc-discipline-snapshot.pdf.
21
Id. Although African-American boys are subject to the most discipline, African-American girls are subject to far
higher rates of discipline than are white girls. Id.
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The University of California Los Angeles Civil Rights Project has also recently issued an
extensive report on school discipline with similar findings.22 In particular, the study found that
suspensions of African Americans more than doubled between 1972, when 11.8% of black
students received a suspension, and 2010 when 24.3% of black students were suspended.23
During the same time period, white students experienced only a modest increase in suspensions
from 6% to 7.1% of students.24 Female black students had a suspension rate that was higher than
the rate for males of all other races.25
A recent study conducted by the Center for the Study of Race and Equity at the
University of Pennsylvania analyzed data from school districts located in the South.26 In an
astounding eighty-four of the 132 school districts analyzed, African Americans were 100% of the
suspended students, and in all 132 school districts black students were suspended at a rate five
times higher than the rate for the overall student population.27 The study also found that although
suspensions decreased overall in Texas, the disproportionate impact of suspensions on African
Americans increased.28 These studies –and there are many more –paint a consistent and coherent
portrait of the school discipline process, one that severely disadvantages African-American
students and has done so since at least the 1970s.29
The data are irrefutable, but that does not end the debate or determine what the
appropriate remedial response should be. Suspensions tend to be viewed in a binary fashion:
either they are justified by the behavior of the students, or they are discriminatory. This binary
approach is particularly prominent among lawyers given that within a legal framework there are
no ties, only a winner and loser—a justified suspension or a discriminatory suspension. But it
might not be so simple, as we will see as we explore the various justifications that are typically
asserted to defend the disparities.
Skeptics of the continuing prevalence of discrimination are almost certain to respond to
the statistics by asserting that the disproportionate discipline is the result of disproportionately
poor behavior among African American students. In other words, African- American youth are
22

Daniel J. Losen & Tia Elena Martinez, Out of School and Off Track: The Overuse of Suspensions in American
Middle
and
High
Schools,
CIV.
RTS.
PROJECT
(Apr.
8,
2013),
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/resources/projects/center-for-civil-rights-remedies/school-to-prison-folder/federalreports/out-of-school-and-off-track-the-overuse-of-suspensions-in-american-middle-and-high-schools.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id. One of the study’s interesting findings was that school districts varied widely in their use of suspensions, with
some large school districts such as Philadelphia being labeled as having a low frequency while many school districts
had extremely high rates of suspension. Id.
26
EDWARD J. SMITH & SHAUN R. HARPER, DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT OF K-12 SCHOOL SUSPENSION AND
EXPULSION
ON
BLACK
STUDENTS
IN
SOUTHERN
STATES
1
(2015),
http://www.gse.upenn.edu/equity/sites/gse.upenn.edu.equity/files/publications/Smith_Harper_Report.pdf.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
For additional studies see Russell K. Skiba et al., The Color of Discipline: Sources of Racial and Gender
Disproportionality
in
School
Punishment,
IND.
EDUC.
POL’Y
CTR.
3
(2000),
www.Indiana.edu/~equity/docs/ColorOfDiscipline.pdf (summarizing findings of prior studies); Lyndsey Layton,
Study Finds Racial Disparities in Texas Elementary Schools’ Disciplinary Steps, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2015, at 3
(study by Texas Appleseed “shows that black students, especially boys, are suspended and expelled at
disproportionately high rates and are labeled as troublemakers as early as pre-kindergarten.”).
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suspended more because they engage more often in behavior that warrants suspension. There are
at least three responses to this claim. First, it should not be assumed that the excessive level of
suspensions is the result of excessively poor behavior. To assume as much is to dismiss the force
of the data at least its implications. And this would lead to the second response, which is how do
we, or could we, know that it is the behavior of the students that triggers the suspensions rather
than the disparate application of the rules, which are almost invariably discretionary in nature.
For example, a study of the Texas school system found that only three percent of disciplinary
actions were issued for behavior for which state law mandated suspension or expulsion.30 Most
suspensions arise from behavior that is subjective in nature, such as disruptive classroom activity
or disrespectful behavior, that is not easy to document. It is also difficult to know how many
children got away with similar behavior or how many children received lesser punishment
(detention or warnings) for identical or similar behavior, rendering the data, at best, inconclusive.
Third, a number of studies have disputed the differential-behavior theory. For example,
researchers have found that many office referrals that ultimately lead to suspension are the result
of students questioning established practices or teacher authority and that these students are
disproportionately students of color.31 Consistent with this finding, African-American students
are more likely to be disciplined for “defiance” and “noncompliance.”32 A recent study
demonstrated that disruptive white children are often handled very differently than are disruptive
black children – white children are more commonly provided with medical treatment, such as
drug therapy, whereas black children tend to be treated in a more punitive or criminal way. 33 In
other words, disruptive white children are likely to be seen as suffering from Attention Deficit
Hyperactivity Disorder, while similarly disruptive black students might be seen as bad or
potentially criminal kids. Divergent judgments such as these are not innocent; rather, they
represent differential treatment steeped in racial stereotypes.
All of this is to suggest that, even if the behavior —or some of it—might warrant
suspension, that is not to say that white children are not being treated differently or that lesser
forms of punishment might be more appropriate. Seizing on suspension as an appropriate
punishment is likely tied to perceptions that black children are troublemakers deserving of severe
punishment rather than young children who need to be redirected in one form or another. Indeed,
a recent study found that teachers and school administrators frequently treat African-American
boys as if they are older and more responsible for their actions than is developmentally
appropriate.34
30

See TONY FABELO ET AL., BREAKING SCHOOLS’ RULES: A STATEWIDE STUDY OF HOW SCHOOL DISCIPLINE
RELATES TO STUDENTS’ SUCCESS AND JUVENILE JUSTICE INVOLVEMENT 38 (2011) (“Less than 3 percent of
violations were related to behavior for which state law mandates expulsion or removal.”).
31
Frances Varus & K.M. Cole, “I Didn’t Do Nothin”: The Discursive Construction of School Suspension, 34 URB.
REV. 87, 91 (2002) (arguing that suspensions often occur as a result of a normalized discursive code that AngloAmericans have more access to).
32
See Anne Gregory & Rhona S. Weinstein, The Discipline Gap and African Americans: Defiance or Cooperation
in the High School Classroom, 46 J. SCH. PSYCHOL. 455, 459 (2008) (noting high number of disciplinary infractions
relating to defiance or challenging authority among African-American males).
33
See David M. Ramey, The Social Structure of Criminalized and Medicalized School Discipline, 88 SOC. EDUC.
181, 194 (2015) (finding that school districts with large minority and poor student populations are more likely to
implement “criminalized” disciplinary policies and that white children are more likely to get medical treatment). 1
34
Phillip Atiba Goff et al., The Essence of Innocence: Consequences of Dehumanizing Black Children, 106 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 526, 540 (2014) (“Black boys can be misperceived as older than they actually are
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One of the key issues, here, is that the data that might convince a skeptic that the
disciplinary system is being applied in a discriminatory way likely do not exist. There will likely
be no data on overall behavior that would allow for comparison of the treatment of black and
white students, and it would be infeasible to conduct a random experiment of children essentially
“performing” in a disruptive manner to determine whether they are treated similarly or
differently. The statistics will either be meaningful or not, but it will be difficult to convince
anyone by accumulating additional information. Researchers have sought to clear away some of
the arguments by determining whether the disparities in discipline might be attributable to class
rather than race, but after taking into account socioeconomic status, it is clear that race remains a
significant predictor of discipline.35
Even if it is the case that there is evidence that African-American boys misbehave at a
higher rate than other students, the inquiry should not end there, because the question remains—
what might account for the higher rate of misbehavior among African-American boys. One
might attribute the higher rate to the nature of the students, but there is no neutral reason why
one would choose that explanation over others. It may be that the misbehavior of black youth is
in response to inequitable treatment in the classroom. A teacher may treat transgressions of black
males more harshly than that of other students, and may also respond more harshly than to the
transgressions of other students, ultimately leading to negative, reactive behavior by the
reprimanded student. A student, for example, who is repeatedly told to “sit down and shut up”, or
told that he will amount to nothing as occurs in some classrooms, may respond by what will be
perceived as misbehaving or disrepect. 36 Other students who are told that they must work twice
as hard—a common message to African-American youth—may rebel at what they properly
perceive to be an unfair edict.
When assessing data, such as the disproportionate application of disciplinary standards,
there is a tendency to see that application as something other than discriminatory, even by those
who seek change in the system. Teachers, it is often asserted, are likely acting not from
discriminatory animus but rather it is their subconscious biases — stereotypes— that produce the
disparate results.37 This might be so but at the same time this is a circumstance that could just as
easily be treated as a form of intentional discrimination. Certainly, for the ultimate
decisionmaker, typically the school principal, there is nothing subconscious about the pattern of
discipline. The principal will see all of the students who are being suspended and will know
whether there is a pattern of disparate results. She, like others, may assume that the behavior
warrants suspension rather than taking the time to inquire about how others in the class might be
behaving, or whether the disruptive behavior might be the result of unfair treatment at the hands
and prematurely perceived as responsible for their actions during a developmental period where their peers receive
the beneficial assumption of childlike innocence.”).
35
See Anne Gregory et al., The Achievement Gap and the Discipline Gap: Two Sides of the Same Coin, 39 EDUC.
RESEARCHER, 59, 61 (“[T]he highly consistent finding that race/ethnicity remains a significant predictor of
discipline even after statistically controlling for measures of family income suggests that student SES is not
sufficient to explain the racial discipline gap.”).
36
Extensive observational research has demonstrated that African-American boys are often treated differently and
hostilely within classrooms and that their behavior is shaped by that differential treatment. See, e.g., ANN ARNETT
FERGUSON, BAD BOYS: PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN THE MAKING OF BLACK MASCULINITY 88 (2000) (“This apprehension of
black boys as inherently different both in terms of character and of their place in the social order is a crucial factor in
teacher disciplinary practices.”).
37
The concept of implicit bias is discussed more fully in section III.2.
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of a teacher or school official. But it is hard to see why the principal’s decision to suspend
African-American boys without delving further into the pattern of suspensions she observes
should be labeled as unconscious bias rather than a form of intentional bias. Her decision to
move forward with suspensions without further inquiry is an intentional decision made against a
background of clearly racial results. Alternatively, it may be that the Principal wants to appear
supportive towards her teachers rather than challenging their actions. But it is again important to
emphasize that choosing to support her teachers over her students is a conscious choice, one that
may be putting loyalty ahead of rooting out discrimination. That is neither a neutral nor an
inevitable choice, and again, there is nothing necessarily unconscious or implicit about making
such a choice. It might be different if the Principal, or a Superintendent, reviewed the
suspensions and determined they were justified, but to ignore the racial pattern of discipline is to
choose some value, whatever it might be, over racial equality, and that is a choice that is made
deliberately.
B. Police Stops.
Another area where the data are incontrovertible but the conclusions are contested
involves police stops. There are many kinds of police stops, but the two that have been most
commonly subject to discrimination analysis involve automobile stops and stops on the street,
the latter of which are also known as stop-and-frisks or Terry stops.38 These latter stops are more
controversial, though the findings are often even more compelling than in the automobile
context. For example, in a recent lawsuit over the City of New York’s stop-and-frisk policy, it
was shown that more than 80% of all individuals who were stopped were African-American or
Latino, in a city where African Americans and Latinos constituted 52% of the population.39 The
city sought to justify its policy by noting that a similarly high percentage of criminal suspects
were African-American or Latino40 an argument the district court thought was too broad because
it lumped all African Americans and Latinos together with the very small group that actually
engages in criminal activity.41 One of the more interesting findings from the case was a statistic
put forth by the plaintiffs: only about six percent of the searches were inadequate based on the
law; the remaining searches were consistent with the governing legal standards.42 Yet the sheer
number of stops -- in the millions, based on the evidence presented at trial-- meant that even a
six-percent error rate led to thousands of unlawful stops.
In any event, the justifications for street stops are different in nature from automobile
stops, and the rest of this section focuses on automobile stops, where the evidence of
discriminatory police action is difficult to refute. This is not a new issue as vehicle stops by law
enforcement drew national attention in the late 1990s based on a series of studies and lawsuits
challenging highway patrol stops in New Jersey and subsequently in other areas, including
38

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); for a thorough analysis of the case and the
various evidence, see generally Arthur Garrison, NYPD Stop & Frisk, Perceptions of Criminals, Race and the
Meaning of Terry v. Ohio: A Content Analysis of Floyd et al. v. City of New York, 15 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 66
(2014).
40
Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 561.
41
Id.
42
See John Cassidy, The Statistical Debate Behind the Stop-and-Frisk Verdict, NEW YORKER (Aug. 13, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/the-statistical-debate-behind-the-stop-and-frisk-verdict (“On this
basis alone, he concluded that six per cent of the stops—about two hundred thousand of them—were ‘apparently
unjustified.’”).
39
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Illinois and Maryland.43 These studies all demonstrated that the police pulled over AfricanAmerican drivers in far greater proportions than their representation among drivers on the
highways studied. At the time, many of the stops were part of a broader “war on drugs” and
involved efforts to interdict drug traffickers who were using some of the main highways on the
East Coast and elsewhere to move their products.44 But these stops had a quality similar to New
York’s stop-and-frisk practices. Many officers seemed to be treating all African Americans, or
only African Americans, as drug smugglers rather than the small cohort who were actually
engaging in trafficking. The attention brought to these cases spawned legislation in a number of
states that required police officers to record their stops and the reason for those stops. In other
jurisdictions, such as Los Angeles, similar data were compiled in the context of lawsuit
settlements, and it is the more recent data to which I will now turn.
The recent studies all show similar results: African Americans, and often Latinos, are
stopped more frequently than whites and much higher than their representation in the population,
although contraband is found at a higher rate among whites who are stopped. A 2014 report of
Missouri vehicle stops statewide indicated that African Americans were stopped at higher rates
than were whites and were 1.7 times more likely to be searched than were whites, even though
whites had a higher hit rate—26.9% of searches produced contraband—than did African
Americans, with a hit rate of 21.4%. In reviewing the report, the state Attorney General noted—
in what seemed like a state of exasperation—that the racial disparities had increased since 2000
when the data collection began.45 In analyzing similar data from Rhode Island, the ACLU noted
that in many local jurisdictions racial disparities had increased since 2003, when the first study
was conducted.46
The New York Times recently conducted an extensive analysis of police stops in
Greensboro, North Carolina, where pursuant to North Carolina law, detailed data are kept
regarding automobile stops. African Americans make up 39% of the population of Greensboro
but accounted for 54% of those who were pulled over.47 Once pulled over, African Americans
were searched at rates that were twice as high as the rate for whites, yet, just as was true in the
Missouri study, contraband was found more frequently on whites.48 Among the various North
Carolina agencies the newspaper studied, the State Highway Patrol performed the best in
reducing disparities, although the numbers were not encouraging; African-American drivers
were still 1.5 times more likely to be pulled over than white drivers.49 And in Durham, North
43

The ACLU has been a leader in challenging racial profiling in automobile stops. For an early report, see David A.
Harris, Driving While Black: Racial Profiling on Our Nation’s Highways, ACLU (June 1999),
https://www.aclu.org/report/driving-while-black-racial-profiling-our-nations-highways.
44
The drug-related enforcement efforts of the 1990s produced a number of lawsuits, most of which were
unsuccessful. Though, many settled. See generally, e.g., United States v. Duque-Nava, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (D.
Kan. 2004) (finding that statistics proved racial effect but not intent); Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612 (7th
Cir. 2001) (rejecting discrimination claims). For a discussion of the various issues in the early cases, see R. Richard
Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing & the Drug War, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571, 587 (2003).
45
See 2014 Vehicle Stops Executive Summary, MO. ATT’Y GEN. (2014), https://ago.mo.gov/home/vehicle-stopsreport/2014-executive-summary.
46
See Data Shows Racial Profiling Increasing in Searches During Motor Vehicle Stops, ACLU (Dec. 15, 2014),
http://riaclu.org/news/post/data-shows-racial-profiling-increasing-in-searches-during-motor-vehicle-sto.
47
See Sharon LaFranieve & Andrew W. Lehren, The Disproportionate Risks of Driving While Black, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 24, 2015, at A1.
48
Id.
49
Id.
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Carolina, the authors of an extensive study found that, “[t]he average Durham officer stops three
whites for every four Blacks but searches one white for every four Blacks.”50
The New York Times reporters also reviewed data from seven other states with reporting
requirements and all showed similar racial disparities.51 In none of the studied jurisdictions did
whites and blacks have an equal likelihood of being stopped, and in all but one, whites were
more likely to be found with contraband.52 Despite that higher hit rate, African-American drivers
were still more likely to be cited or arrested.53 A statewide West Virginia study produced the
same results: black drivers were 1.64 times more likely to be stopped by law enforcement
officers and twice as likely to be searched, though there was a higher hit rate for white drivers.54
Despite that higher hit rate, African-American drivers were more likely to be cited or arrested.55
Two recent studies found slightly different results but reached similar conclusions. A
highly detailed analysis of stops by Kansas City Police officers found that there were no racial
disparities when the focus was on clear violations of the law such as speeding, but when it came
to investigative stops, African-American drivers had twice as high a probability of being
stopped.56 A study of the Washington State Patrol found that, unlike in other jurisdictions, there
were no racial disparities in the initial stops but that African Americans, Latinos, and Native
Americans were subject to higher rates of searches and citations even though the hit rate was
higher for whites.57
Despite the consistency of the findings, police departments are slow to acknowledge the
role race may play in their stops. They typically offer one of several responses and often all of

50

Frank R. Baumgartner, Derek A. Epp & Bayard Lovell, Police Searches of Black and White Motorists, UNCCHAPEL HILL, DEP’T POL. SCI. (Aug. 5, 2014), https://www.unc.edu/~fbaum/TrafficStops/DrivingWhileBlackBaumgartnerLoveEpp-August2014.pdf.
51
Id Seven states were studied, all of which had extensive reporting requirements, so were particular jurisdictions
and departments within those states. The jurisdictions were Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska,
North Carolina, and Rhode Island.
52
Id.
53
Criminal Justice Statistical Analysis Center, West Virginia Traffic Stop Study, DIVISION CRIM. JUST. SERVS. (Feb.
2009), www.djcs.wv/gov/ORSP/SAC/Documents/WVSAC_Traffic_NewOverviewofStatewideFindings2009.pdf.
West Virginia Traffic Stop Study, Criminal Justice Statistical Analysis Center, Division of Criminal Justice Servs.,
Feb.
2009,
available
at
www.djcs.wv/gov/ORSP/SAC/Documents/WVSAC_Traffic_NewOverviewofStatewideFindings2009.pdf Id.56 See
CHARLES EPPS & STEVEN MAYNARD MOODY, PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP
110–14 (2014) (“We have shown that investigatory stops are the stie of pervasive racially biased policing, whereas
traffic-safety stops generally involve unbiased policing.”).
Id.56 See CHARLES EPPS & STEVEN MAYNARD MOODY, PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND
CITIZENSHIP 110–14 (2014) (“We have shown that investigatory stops are the stie of pervasive racially biased
policing, whereas traffic-safety stops generally involve unbiased policing.”).
56
See CHARLES EPPS & STEVEN MAYNARD MOODY, PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND
CITIZENSHIP 110–14 (2014) (“We have shown that investigatory stops are the stie of pervasive racially biased
policing, whereas traffic-safety stops generally involve unbiased policing.”).
57
The results of the analysis, which analyzes the results of other studies, can be found in Task Force on Race and
the Criminal Justice System, Preliminary Report on Race and Washington’s Criminal Justice System, Appendix A
(A-11),
Traffic
Stops
(2011),
https://digital.law.washington.edu/dspacelaw/bitstream/handle/1773.1/1101/87WLR001.pdf?sequence=1. Based on the studies, Native-American drivers had
the highest disparity, as they were subject to search twice as often as whites. Black drivers had a 20% disparity and
Latinos 10%. Id. at A-11.
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them at the same time.58 Often, in contesting the racial disparities that are found in the data,
police departments suggest that it is inappropriate to measure stops by resident population given
that actual drivers might vary from the resident population.59 There are at least two problems
with this argument. First, many of the studies look at driver population, rather than resident
population, and the disparities remain.60 Second, this is a classic argument that the Supreme
Court rejected in the context of a regression study approximately thirty years ago.61 It is not
acceptable, the Court unanimously held, for defendants simply to assert some alternative
explanation.62 Rather, they must provide some plausible reason to believe that the alternative
might be true.63 In this case, that means demonstrating some reason why the driving population
would differ from the resident population, and this is never done. This also applies to another
common explanation offered by defenders of the stops – driving patterns might differ based on
race, but again, the defenders never provide any data to support the assertion. Instead, while
acknowledging the disparities, the departments resist the conclusion that discrimination plays a
role in the police stops.64
Second, borrowing from the stop-and-frisk context, police departments frequently argue
that they are stopping drivers in high-crime areas or areas where suspicious activity occurs.65
This argument is relatively easy to rebut. If it were true, one would observe a higher hit rate of
contraband among black drivers.66 Yet, the hit rates are invariably higher among white drivers, a

58

For a discussion of the of the various critiques see Ridgeway & McDonald, supra note 14; Clayton Mosler & J.
Mitchell Pickerell, Methodological Issues in Biased Policing Research With Applications to the Washington State
Patrol, 35 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 770 (2012).
59
See Ridgeway & McDonald, supra note 14, at 186-87 (discussing how commuter driving patterns may differ
from the commonly used population statistics).
60
For example, a study involving the New Jersey Turnpike and stops made by the State Police had actual
observational data. See John Lamerth, Revised Statistical Analysis of the Incidence of Police Stops and Arrests of
Black Drivers/Travelers on the New Jersey Turnpike Betweens Exits or Interchanges from the Years 1988 Through
1991, Temple University. Dept. of Psychology, 1994, http://www.mass.gov/eopss/docs/eops/faip/new-jersey-studyreport.pdf. See also Geoffrey P. Alpert, Michael Smith & Roger G. Durham, Toward A Better Benchmark:
Assessing the Utility of Not-At-Fault Traffic Crash Data in Racial Profiling Research, Univ. of South Carolina
(2004), ttp://scholarcommons.sc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=crim_facpub (using observational
data in Miami-Dade county do determine driving patterns).
61
See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400 (1986).
62
Id. at 407.
63
In Bazemore, The Supreme Court criticized the defendants for failing to demonstrate that the variables they
claimed should have been included in the regressions would have changed the analysis, noting that the defendants
failed “to demonstrate that when these factors were properly organized and accounted for there was no significant
disparaity between the salaries of blacks and whites.” 478 U.S. at 403 n.14.
64
For example, in responding to a study demonstrating disparities in police stops in Durham, North Carolina, the
police department responded: “We acknowledge that the numerical data that is being put forth as statistical
evidence illustrates a numerical disparity, but it does not offer any evidence or answers as to why the disparity
exists.” Durham Police Department Response to theFade Coalition Policy Recommendations, Oct. 31, 2013,
https://durhamnc.gov/DocumentCenter/Home/View/2153.
65
Evan Allen & Travis Anderson, Evans Defends Boston Police After ACLU Report on Racial Bias, BOSTON
GLOBE, Oct. 8, 2014 (noting that the Police “Commissioner William Evans defended the department, and said that
officers focused on high-crime areas and individuals with gang affiliations and criminal records.”).
66
Hit rates, or the percentage of successful searches, were once thought to be the key measure of racial bias. So long
as the searches of African Americans were more frequently successful than searches of whites, the disparities in
searches could be justified. See Nicola Persico & David A. Castleman, Punishment & Crime: Detecting Bias Using
Statistical Evidence to Establish Intentional Discrimination in Racial Profiling Cases, 2005 U. CHI. L. F. 217, 222–
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fact that refutes the notion that the stops are related to criminal activity. And it makes sense that
the hit rate is higher among white drivers because police stop so many fewer white drivers, likely
only when they have a reasonable suspicion. The arbitrariness of police stops for AfricanAmerican drivers is thus confirmed by the lower hit rates.
Several studies have sought to explore some of the alternative explanations police
departments raise. Probably the most sophisticated study was that conducted by Professor Ian
Ayres of Yale Law School regarding the Los Angeles Police Department.67 The Los Angeles
study focused on both automobile and in-person stops and again found that African Americans
were more likely than whites to be stopped, ordered out of their cars, frisked and subjected to
searches even though African Americans were 42.3% less likely to be found with a weapon than
whites.68 African Americans were also 29% more likely to be arrested than whites, and Latinos
were 32% more likely to be arrested.69 The study went on to determine that the stops were not an
artifact of local crime rates, as the authors were able to control for various geographic and
demographic factors.70 Despite the evidence, the Los Angeles Police Department immediately
dismissed the Ayres study by claiming the data, which was from 2003-04, was old, ignoring the
fact that at the time the report was written, it was the most recent data that had been released by
the Department.71 Another study of the Los Angeles Police Department data reached the same
conclusion as the Ayres study and noted further that African Americans were subjected to the
most consensual searches among drivers of different races, even though the police found the
least contraband through such searches.72
III
STATISTICS AND DISCRIMINATION
Not all statistical disparities are the product of discrimination but some are, and central to
achieving greater racial equality will be determining how we can tell the difference--how we
know when an observed statistical disparity should be equated with discrimination? Or to frame
the issue in the context of this essay, how do we know when racial disparities in school discipline
or police stops should be treated as discrimination? It is important to highlight the phrase
“treated as discrimination” because ultimately the question of what constitutes discrimination is a
25 (discussing the importance of hit rates to assessing bias). However, once the studies demonstrated higher hit rates
among whites, the emphasis on hit rates, at least among police departments, has disappeared.
67
Professor Ayres is the author of a number of important studies documenting discrimination in a variety of fields.
See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender & Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV.
817, 822 (1991) (documenting discriminatory pricing within car negotiations; Ian Ayres & Joel Waldfogel, A
Market Test for Race Discrimination in the Bail Setting, 46 STAN. L. REV. 987, 1008 (1994) (documenting
discrimination in setting bail). His work was transformed into an important and influential book on discrimination.
See generally IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? NON-TRADITIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND GENDER
DISCRIMINATION (2001).
68
See Ian Ayres & Jonathan Borowski, A Study of Racially Disparate Outcomes in the Los Angeles Police
Department, ACLU (Oct. 2008), islandia.law.yale.edu/ayres/Ayres%20LAPD%20Report.pdf. The study is
summarized in Andrew Blankstein, Study Cites Disparities in LAPD Stops, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2008, at A1.
69
Blankstein, supra note 68, at A12.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
See Megan Armentrout, Cops & Stops: Racial Profiling and A Preliminary Statistical Analysis of Los Angeles
Police
Dept.
Traffic
Stops
and
Searches,
Cal.
State
Poly.
Pomona
(June
2007),
http://www.public.asu.edu/~etcamach/AMSSI/reports/copsnstops.pdf.
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legal and social question, a judgment in the case of statistical disparities that those disparities are
likely the product of discrimination.
A. The Meaning of Statistical Disparities.
There is no easy metric to define discrimination, but, ultimately, we have to determine
how certain, or how confident, we must be, to conclude that the disparities are the result of
discriminatory acts. In litigation, common statistical methods are used to determine the
likelihood that the observed results were the product of chance or some other factor, such as
discrimination. Depending on the data, it is also possible to employ regression analysis to ferret
out, or limit, alternative explanations for observed disparities.73 But the standards of proof are
very high – typically, within the social-science framework that governs statistical analysis, one
would seek a 95% confidence level—equivalent to two standard deviations—before eliminating
chance as a possible explanation for the disparities.74 This is a significantly higher standard than
the common civil standard that requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence, which
requires only that a plaintiff prove her case as more likely than not true. Nevertheless, the
confidence level is rarely the problem with establishing discrimination based on statistics.
Rather, it is exceptionally difficult to rule out all other possible explanations, which is what
discrimination skeptics generally require. For example, an infamous Supreme Court case failed
to accept the findings of a study demonstrating racial disparities in the application of the death
penalty even though the study controlled for more than three hundred factors because not every
nondiscriminatory reason could be excluded.75
To return to the earlier examples, the underlying question is how to determine whether
African-American students are suspended as a result of discrimination? The observed disparities
are only a starting point, but statistically significant disparities would support the assumption that
the disparities are not the product of chance. But that would not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that racial discrimination is the proper explanation. Rather, the disparities could be
the result of differential behavior; they might also arise from school districts that suspend high
levels of students or from some other nondiscriminatory explanation. Even though studies have
shown that African-American students are typically treated differently for their behavior than
73

The statistical methods are now well accepted. For a discussion of the use of statistical methods in employment
discrimination cases, where they are likely most prominent in legal cases, see DIANNE AVERY ET AL., EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE 204–10 (8th ed. 2010). See
generally Theodore Eisenberg, Empirical Methods and the Law, 95 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 665, 667 (2000).
74
Courts, in particular the Supreme Court, have borrowed the statistical methods beginning with an important
footnote in a jury selection case. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 n.3 (1977) (discussing the importance
of tests of statistical significance in analyzing statistical data). Courts continue to require a minimum of two standard
deviations, or the equivalent of a 95% confidence level, as a measure of statistical significance adequate to require
further inquiry. See Adams v. Ameritech Servs., Inc., 231 F.3d 414, 424 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Two standard deviations
is normally enough to show that it is extremely unlikely . . . that the disparity is due to chance.”).
75
The case is McKleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987): perhaps the most vivid illustration of how difficult it can
be to persuade a discrimination skeptic. Nearly thirty years later, studies continue to demonstrate that African
Americans who kill whites have a disproportionately high probability of receiving a death sentence. See John J.
Donohue III, An Empirical Evaluation of the Connecticut Death Penalty System Since 1973: Are There Unlawful
Racial, Gender, and Geographic Disparities?, 11 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 637, 647-48 (2014) (“Specifically minority
defendants who commit capital-eligible murders of white victims are over five times as likely to receive a death
sentence as minority defendants who commit capital-eligible murder of minority victims.”).
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they would if they were white, it is easy to discount those studies when it comes to an actual
school district, and it will often be difficult to have appropriate data on the school or district
level. The data on police stops is more complete but still lacking as to those who are not stopped,
and police departments can still offer up hypothetical explanations for the disparities that are
difficult to refute solely based on data.76
As previously noted, Supreme Court case law provides important but oft-ignored
guidance for assessing statistical proof of discrimination. In particular, the case of Bazemore v.
Friday requires parties challenging statistical analysis to refute that analysis based on the data
rather than offering up alternative explanations.77 That case involved salary disparities between
black and white agricultural extension agents. The defendants suggested that some factors other
than race might explain the disparities. For example, agents worked on different crops, and it was
possible that agents working on certain more desirable crops (tobacco, as this was 1970s North
Carolina) might have been paid more, or those working in certain counties might have likewise
been paid more.78 The Supreme Court held, however, that a defendant cannot simply offer
hypothetical alternatives but instead must demonstrate the validity of an alternative explanation
by using empirical data.79 In other words offering alternatives unsupported by data is an
impermissible legal strategy. In the Bazemore case, that meant that the defendants had to
establish that the pay differentials were, in fact, attributable to different crops or different county
contributions. In the police context, this would likewise mean that the police department would
have to prove that the drivers in a particular area or jurisdiction differ from the resident
population, or that the driving habits of African Americans differ from whites in a way that
would lead to them being pulled over more frequently.
If followed, this principle would eliminate at least one of the rationales that
discrimination skeptics use to reject statistical findings. However, the principle is rarely
followed, including by the Supreme Court itself. In a variety of contexts, such as in the recent
massive class-action claim against Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court has expressed skepticism over
statistical methods of proof.80 This suggests that it will be difficult to convince discrimination
skeptics of the presence of discrimination purely through statistical analysis and that something
76

Data on racial profiling have been subject to extensive analysis. For helpful discussions of the issues that arise
and the difficulty of dispelling doubt, see generally Chet K.W. Pager, Lies, Damned Lies, Statistics and Racial
Profiling, 13 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 515 (2004); Nicola Persico, Racial Profiling? Detecting Bias Using Statistical
Evidence, 1 ANN. REV. ECON. 229 (2009).
77
Bazemore, 478 U.S. at
78
Id. at 394. It seems relevant to note that as a young attorney (in other words many years ago) at the Justice
Department, I worked on the Bazemore case when it was on remand from the Supreme Court.
79
Id.
80
In the Wal-Mart case, the Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ statistical evidence by noting, “A regional pay
disparity . . .may be attributable to only a small set of Wal-Mart stores and cannot by itself establish the uniform
strore-by-store disparity upon which the plaintiffs’ theory of commonality depends.” Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes,
564 U.S. 338, 357 (2011). Earlier in the opinion, the Court also expressed doubt about the likelihood of widespread
discrimination despite the plaintiffs’ extensive statistical evidence: “[L]eft to their own devices most managers in
any corporation – and surely most managers in a corporation that forbids sex discrimination – would select sexneutralpreference-based criteria for hiring and promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all.” Id. at 355. I
have previously written on the Court’s skeptical treatment of statistical proof of discrimination in the context of the
Wal-Mart litigation. See Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment Law After Wal-Mart v. Dukes,
32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 477 (2011). For an additional case dismissing statistical proof of discrimination see
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 469 (1996) (rejecting statistical analysis in selective prosecution case)..
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more will be needed. What “more” might help is difficult to know; surely by this point in our
history, we should not be looking for a smoking gun or a confession. But it also seems
increasingly clear that further progress challenging statistical disparities through litigation is
unlikely. Instead, as discussed below, convincing public and private actors of the need to address
the statistical disparities is likely a more effective remedy.
This is not to say that litigation will prove fruitless. Class-action discrimination claims
based primarily on statistical analyses remain a small but vital part of judicial dockets,
particularly in federal courts, and the claims are often successful.81 With class actions, success
often turns on having the class certified because settlements typically follow, but a number of
successful cases have gone to judgment in the last few years.82 It seems likely that many of these
cases proceeded before discrimination sympathizers, those who want to know more as discussed
earlier, but it is also the case that litigation remains a viable, if limited, means of bringing
redress.
B. Discrimination is Intentional Not Implicit.
In the area of contemporary discrimination research, there has been a parallel
development that has further complicated proving systemic discrimination. Within the legal and
popular literature, there is a growing fascination with what is typically defined as “implicit bias,”
bias that is often described as unconscious in nature in that the perpetrator is unaware of her own
biases.83 The typical measuring stick for the presence of implicit bias is the Implicit Association
Test (IAT), an online test developed more than a decade ago that requires individuals to make
rapid judgments based on screen images.84 Since its inception, the IAT has documented implicit
bias in individuals based on associating African Americans with more negative words, and these
81

The law firm of Seyfarth & Shaw produces an annual report on workplace class actions, and recently noted that
settlements for all such class actions “reached an all-time high of $2.48 billion” with $295 million attributable to
employment discrimination settlements. The employment discrimination settlements demonstrated a significant
increase over recent prior years. See 12th Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report, pp. 1-7 (2016),
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/458698/employment+litigation+tribunals/Its+Here+Seyfarths+2016+Workp
lace+Class+Action+Report. A recent study of class action certifications also noted that even after the Wal-Mart
decision, many class action cases continued to be certified. See Michael Selmi & Sylvia Tsakos, Employment
Discrimination Class Actions After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 48 AKRON L. REV. 803 (2015) (analyzing class action
decisions after Wal-Mart and concluding that there was not a significant decrease in certifications).
82
In a contentious and long-running litigation involving the New York Fire Department and its use of written
examinations , the Second Circuit upheld a lower court’s determination of liability based on disparate impact theory
but not disparate treatment. See United States v. City of New York, 717 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2013). A gender
discrimination lawsuit against Novartis Pharmaceuticals resulted in a trial verdict of more than $250 million, and the
case was later settled for $175 million. See Velez v. Novartis Pharmaceutical Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125945
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). The Supreme Court also recently held that the disparate impact theory was available for claims
filed under the Fair Housing Act, a decision that is likely to spawn substantial housing-related litigation. See Texas
Dept. of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 2507 (2015)..
83
The list is long, but, for a sampling of recent scholarship that emphasizes the role of implicit bias in contemporary
discrimination, see generally Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997 (2006); Cynthia Lee, Making
Race Salient: Trayvon Martin & Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555 (2013); L.
Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. 1143 (2012).
84
For an early discussion of the IAT see Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit
Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1465 (1998)The test is
available at Project Implicit, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/
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findings have been relied on to indicate that many people might engage in discriminatory acts
without even being aware of their own discriminatory impulses.85 It is often asserted that this
kind of implicit bias, in which an individual actor may not intend to act in discriminatory ways,
underlies much of contemporary discrimination.86 It is now common for racial profiling and
school discipline—and many other statistical inequalities—to be described as products of
implicit bias.87
The problem with the obsession with implicit bias is that implicit bias is a concept
defined mainly by what it is not: it is not explicit. That definition, however, is not particularly
helpful when one is trying to understand the underlying basis for repeated statistical disparities.
If we think of explicit bias as equivalent to what is sometimes referred to as overt bias – the kind
of bias that is present in signs such as “No Blacks Allowed” – nearly all of contemporary
discrimination will be seen as implicit, which might be then seen as —unconscious or nonintentional, and in many ways less blameworthy because implicit bias is often defined as
automatic in nature.88 Within the literature, particularly the legal literature, this analysis involves
a two-step mistake, and both of the mistakes make it more difficult to address contemporary
discrimination.
The first mistake is to treat implicit bias as beyond one’s control. This is a distinctive
feature of the IAT, which is designed as a rapid-response test so that, almost by definition, it is
difficult to control one’s responses.89 But very few meaningful actions are the product of snap
judgments, and this would include school suspensions and police stops or searches, and we could
add to the list, employment decisions, sentencing and the like. Those who advocate the use of
the IAT as a measure of discrimination often point to experimental studies that demonstrate
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Within law, UCLA Professor Jerry Kang has been the most prolific supporter of the IAT. See, e.g., Jerry Kang et
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limited, but meaningful, correlations between IAT scores and behavior.90 But what the advocates
overlook is the extensive literature on the ability to control implicit bias.
Studies have repeatedly demonstrated that various interventions can limit the activation
of implicit or unconscious bias. For example, individuals primed with counter stereotypical
examples demonstrate less bias in their IAT scores, and the decrease in bias lasts for an extended
period of time.91 Broader research on bias across a wide area, not restricted to the IAT,
consistently demonstrates the efficacy of a review process.92 When individuals know their
actions will be reviewed, they are far less likely to allow their discriminatory impulses to
interfere with their actions.93 To offer one recent example, a study of baseball umpires found that
umpires were more likely to provide a favorable strike zone to pitchers of the same race as the
umpire, but the favoritism receded when the game was nationally televised, presumably because
the strike zone would be more closely monitored by the national audience.94 In another sports
study, the authors found that basketball referees reduced their bias in foul calls after an earlier
study revealing racial bias received widespread public attention.95
Studies have also shown that those who are motivated to control implicit bias can often
do so. Extensive research has shown that people can work to reduce prejudice in various ways:
some may want to reduce only prejudice that is visible, while others will work to reduce
prejudice even when discrimination is not apparent.96 The excellent work of Frank Dobbin and
90
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his colleagues on workplace diversity has demonstrated that when management makes diversity
a priority, in part by designating accountable officials, results will follow.97 In other words, even
if it is true that most discrimination is now implicit in nature -- more on that in a moment -- it is
not the case that it is likewise inevitable. There are many ways to control and reduce bias,
implicit or otherwise.
The second misstep in the implicit-bias assessment is related and implicates the
indiscriminate use of the term. Once individuals have been made aware of the presence of
implicit bias and they fail to make any efforts to control that bias, it is far less clear that the
subsequent acts should be treated as involving implicit bias. This returns to the fact that
individuals are capable of controlling – or attempting to control – their biases, and failing to do
so can be a sign that something other than implicit bias is at work.
Returning to police stops, accepting that the officer does not consciously pull the driver
over because of his race—which is the implication of implicit bias—all of the interactions
thereafter will be taken with a consciousness of the driver’s race. The police officer will also
likely know that African-American drivers are disproportionately pulled over and less frequently
found to have contraband than white drivers and every step thereafter is informed by that
knowledge. The decision to search the car will not be made either as a snap judgment, as in the
IAT, or without regard to the person’s race, but the officer will be conscious of the driver’s race
and will make a deliberate decision to search the car. In other words, at least after the initial stop,
there is nothing implicit about the officer’s actions—unless by implicit we mean the officer did
not claim to be acting because of the driver’s race. But that would be a highly unusual definition
of implicit, or of discrimination more broadly. Proof of discrimination has never required a
confession or even an acknowledgment by the person engaging in discriminatory behavior.
The school principal is in the same position. She would observe that African Americans
are overrepresented among the students who are suspended, and she would make the conscious
decision to explore the basis for the suspension more thoroughly or to ignore that fact and
proceed with the suspensions. Again, there is no reason to label her behavior as implicit and
there is little to be gained by doing so. Surely, repeated behavior by governmental agencies and
individuals, with layers of oversight, should be treated differently from an isolated incident by a
single police officer or teacher, but the rush to the implicit bias explanation largely ignores the
difference between aggregate and individual behavior. Contrary to the message of implicit bias,
these are not the unconscious actions of good people who cannot help themselves; these are
individuals who are, at a minimum, unconcerned about the racial implications of their actions.98
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To take a rather mundane but illustrative example, suppose Person A bumps into Person
B and offers the common apology, “Sorry, I did not mean to do that.” Person B would likely
accept that explanation on the first and perhaps the second incidents but, after the third, fourth, or
hundredth, she would likely reject the excuse and assume the person intended to bump into her,
or at a minimum, was not paying attention or did not care. Even within the framework of implicit
bias, at some point repeated behavior should no longer be defined as implicit in nature. There is
no particular reason to assume differently about incidents in which the police, school
administrators, employers, judges, or anyone else engages in repeated acts with strong racial
implications especially fter they have been made aware of the possible force of implicit bias and
the ability to control it.
There is, it would seem, a strategic desire to define behavior as implicit: individuals
might be more motivated to acknowledge and change their behavior if it is seen as common and
not racist in nature. As a strategic move, this may work with some well-intentioned people, but
we have been waiting a long time for those individuals to alter their behavior.99 Emphasizing the
strategic nature of the implicit bias discussion is important because there is a tendency to treat
the various theories of discrimination as if they represent a thing rather than a theory. To say that
someone’s behavior has been influenced by implicit bias means their actions have been
influenced by stereotypical thinking of which the person may be unaware and of which they will
almost certainly disclaim responsibility. Fair enough, but their behavior could just as easily be
defined as discriminatory in nature without the need for a label. Implicit bias suggests that its
opposite might be explicit bias, which could be equated with old-fashioned discrimination or
racist attitudes. This would be reflected in the common mantra “that we now have racism without
racists.”100 But the world of discrimination need not be seen in such a as binary fashion – it does
not have to be either implicit or explicit, it can run across a spectrum that might involve some
conscious attitudes mixed with less conscious stereotypical thinking. If we are forced to rely on a
binary approach to discrimination, we should think of lawful and unlawful. Within that legal
schema, as I argued many years ago, an individual’s motive is irrelevant to establishing liability
though it can be relevant as a matter of damages.101
Part of the problem with labeling troublesome behavior as implicit in nature is that softpedaling the behavior allows people to escape without responsibility. Moreover, it likely conveys
the impression that there is something different about implicit bias than other forms of
discrimination. However, the message we want to send, particularly if we want to remedy the
consequences of the underlying actions, is that implicit bias is just another form of
discrimination, not better not worse but still discrimination.
This is not to suggest that implicit bias is not a real or important concept – it is both, and
has aided our understanding of contemporary discrimination. It has, however, been overstated in
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recent analyses on racial bias. Implicit bias should not be equated with its counterpart explicit
bias if explicit bias is overt and unambiguous, and inevitably leads to a finding of discrimination.
That kind of discrimination on a broad scale has not existed for many years, and it is a mistake to
define all remaining discrimination as implicit bias.

IV
CONCLUSION
It is certainly difficult to convert discrimination skeptics into individuals who see
discrimination as remaining part of the national landscape. In many ways, the election of
President Barack Obama has provided additional fuel for skeptics.102 The move to an emphasis
on implicit bias has not had the salutary effect many might have expected, although it has
certainly played a role in the decisions of some individuals and entities to address lingering racial
disparities. Ultimately, whether the disparities are the product of implicit bias or something else
should not be the determining factor for whether those disparities are addressed. Rather, what is
necessary is ensuring that someone is accountable for those disparities, which need to be seen as
problematic regardless of their origin. Any public-school official who looks at the suspension
data should be troubled by those findings both because of the extreme disparities between
suspension rates of African Americans and whites and the harm that students endure when
excluded from public schools. The response to the disparities should not be that the students are
getting what they deserve but that the disparate application of suspension must be addressed, a
step a number of school districts are now taking.103
The same is true with police stops, a context in which it will take initiative by a police
chief or mayor to address disparities. Regardless of whether one concludes that disparities are the
product of discrimination, the disparities should be seen as highly problematic and as
contributing to tension between law-enforcement officers and the communities they serve. Upon
taking office, New York’s Mayor de Blasio quickly settled the litigation over the city’s “stop and
frisk policy” and changed the policy to reduce the number of such searches. 104 In light of the
New York Times article, the Police Chief in Greensboro, North Carolina ordered his police
officers to not stop cars for minor infractions, at least until the Department could better
understand the underlying reasons for the racial disparities in their stops.105 Private companies
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can, and should, take the same initiative without waiting for a determination that their workforce
disparities are discriminatory. The persistent racial disparities that we observe in virtually all
walks of social and economic life demand attention. Even if implicit bias is the proper
explanation for the disparities, those disparities, that bias, is neither inevitable nor uncontrollable.

racial/article,42d2dfc7-ed33 (quoting Police Chief stating, “We must make the necessary changes to ensure that the
issues, created by the statistics and perceptions, are . . . addressed.”).
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